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(§1) Introduction: The Systematic Importance of Heidegger On Relativism 
 
At first glance, it might seem that relativism was not a central issue for Heidegger. He was, of 
course, extremely familiar with the Husserlian and post-Kantian debates which linked 
relativism, logic and psychologism: these had been the focus of his 1914 dissertation, Die 
Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. There he attacks psychologism in part by linking it to 
relativism as Husserl had done before him: the challenge, Heidegger suggests, is to move 
beyond this negative point and to articulate a positive story about judgmental content, one 
that respects the phenomenology of the act of judging in a way that Husserl’s own theory 
allegedly does not (Ga21:107,111).i But whilst Heidegger presses the issues of judgment and 
content closely in his mature work, by the time we reach Sein und Zeit, there is little explicit 
treatment of relativism. At points, Heidegger uses it there simply as a byword for 
philosophical error: he is quick to insist that his views have nothing to do with “a crude 
relativizing” [schlechte Relativierung], he warns against readings of Dilthey as offering a 
“relativistic” Lebensphilosophie and he praises Yorck for seeing through “all ‘groundless’ 
relativisms” (SZ:22,399,401). Admittedly, he does state that “all truth is relative to Dasein’s 
being”, but, having clarified that this does not mean that truth is ‘left to the subject’s 
discretion’, he promptly drops the term and does not take it up again (SZ:227). Similarly, in 
other works, both before and after SZ, relativism is directly treated only in marginal contexts. 
The 1921 lectures Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, for example, warn 
against the “atrophy of relativism” when discussing the link between philosophy and the 
university (Ga61:69), whilst 1935’s Die Frage nach dem Ding , perhaps the clearest 
treatment of the Galilean paradigm shift, uses “Relativismus” only once, in a dismissive 
survey of standard views on indexicals. As elsewhere, it is clear that Heidegger regards both 
the term, this “cheap label”, and the typical reactions to it, as problematic (Ga41:28). 
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 Appearances can be misleading, however. Relativism is in fact fundamental to 
understanding Heidegger’s philosophy and its place in the canon. There are four reasons for 
this.  
First, Heidegger’s refusal to rehash the standard debates around relativism is 
motivated by the belief that these are symptoms of a series of underlying errors (see, for 
example, Ga21:21-2 on the textbook self-reference arguments). By mapping his stance on 
relativism, we can get a better feeling for what those errors were, and how he sought to move 
beyond them. Second, whilst Heidegger avoids the usual terminology and framing, many of 
the issues raised by relativism reoccur in his work on truth and in his epistemology, and need 
to be addressed if that work is to be articulated and defended. Third, Heidegger’s relation to 
relativism is particularly important for understanding how his philosophy relates to some of 
the central tensions in the post-Kantian tradition. For example, to what degree can one really 
combine the transcendental language which SZ borrows from the first Critique with 
Heidegger’s post-Hegelian emphasis on history and his existentialist interest in facticity? 
Does the existential analytic yield anything like a universal transcendental framework or is 
there at best a series of ‘historical a prioris’? How stable is the divide between ontological 
and ontic knowledge? All of these questions are illuminated by approaching them from the 
relativism angle. Fourth, the question of relativism decisively colours the early reception of 
Heidegger’s work. Husserl’s 1931 lecture Phänomenologie und Anthropologie warns 
explicitly against a philosophy based on the “essence of human being’s concrete worldly 
Dasein”: this approach can only lead to “anthropologism”, the pejorative term used for 
species-relativism in the Prolegomena (Husserl 1997:485). Husserl’s charge, roughly, is that 
a philosophy founded on a study of human beings will relativize logic to facts about such 
beings and their mental capacities. Whilst Heidegger is not mentioned by name, it is clear 
that he is the target here: Husserl positions him as combining a rhetoric of authenticity and 
historicity with the kind of psychologism the Prolegomena had attacked in Erdman thirty 
years earlier (Husserl 1975:§§38-41). Such ‘Dasein anthropology’ “constitutes a complete 
reversal of phenomenology's fundamental standpoint” (Husserl 1997:486). To assess the 
accuracy of this charge, and Heidegger’s place in the phenomenological tradition, we need to 
know where he stands on relativism. 
 The structure of this chapter will be very simple. In the first half, I will introduce a 
sophisticated way of reading Heidegger as a relativist; I draw here on the work of Kusch and 
Lafont. In the second half, I present the counter-argument. As I see it, Heidegger is not a 
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relativist; but understanding the relations between his approach and a relativistic one is 
crucial for an evaluation of both his own work and the broader trajectory of post-Kantian 
thought. 
 Before proceeding, a brief caveat. Heidegger was a prolific writer: the 
Gesamtausgabe edition runs to over one hundred volumes. Furthermore, during the course of 
his lifetime, his work undergoes a series of complex stylistic and philosophical shifts – for 
example, during the early 1930s and then again in the aftermath of the war. There is no 
scholarly consensus on the exact nature of these developments or on the degree of continuity 
or change that they imply. Given these facts, it would be impossible to address Heidegger’s 
views on “relativism” or indeed any other topic in a single article without radically restricting 
the chronological range of the discussion. I will therefore focus on Heidegger’s best-known 
work, Sein und Zeit (1927), and on the account developed there and refined in subsequent 
texts. In this sense, what follows is largely, although by no means exclusively, a study of 
‘early Heidegger’; for stylistic reasons, I will speak simply of ‘Heidegger’, taking the 
qualification as understood. 
 
(§2) Heidegger as Relativist: Lafont’s Reading 
 
Explicitly relativist readings of Heidegger have been advanced by both Kusch and Lafont 
(Kusch 1989; Lafont 2000, 2007). In what follows, I will focus on Lafont’s account, both 
because of its large influence on the recent secondary literature and because it explicitly 
brings out the connections to Kant that I think are crucial.ii 
 Lafont’s basic claim is that Heidegger is a “conceptual scheme” relativist who holds 
that “truth is relative to a prior understanding of being” (Lafont 2002:187). There are in fact 
two important issues here. The first is the assumption that one can equate “world-disclosures, 
understandings of being, conceptual schemes” (Lafont 2002:187). For Lafont Heideggerian 
understanding is tacitly propositional and closely related to the predicative structure found in 
language (Lafont 2000:181n1); Kusch likewise describes Heidegger as a “linguistic 
relativist” (Kusch 1989: 21, see also 196-7). In this Lafont and Kusch differ markedly from 
the standard view on which Heidegger’s achievement was precisely to break with what 
Carman called the “assertoric paradigm”, the tacit modelling of meaning on language 
(Carman 2003:216). This debate, whilst vital for a broader understanding of Heidegger, 
would take us too far afield here, and so I set it aside.iii Instead, I want to focus on the second 
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aspect of Lafont’s approach, the relativisation claim.  To understand that, we need to begin 
by looking at Lafont’s treatment of the a priori. 
On Lafont’s model, Heidegger’s relativism is primarily a function of his attempt to 
combine a quasi-Kantian story about the a priori with an increased emphasis on history. The 
basic idea is as follows. On Kant’s picture, there is a single, universal a priori structure shared 
at least by all human agents.iv For Heidegger, in contrast, there are supposedly multiple a 
priori structures, each tied to a particular historical period. As Lafont puts it: 
[U]nderstanding of being is not the (eternal) endowment of a transcendental ego…but 
is merely contingent, changes historically and cannot be put under control at will. It is 
thus a fate into which human beings are thrown. (Lafont 2002:186). 
These structures – “world-disclosures, understandings of being, conceptual schemes” – 
determine how we experience entities, just as for Kant the a priori conditions of human 
understanding and sensibility condition appearances. By extension, all truths about the 
objects of experience are relative to those structures (Lafont 2007:105).  
Heidegger is thus a relativist in a double sense. First, “truth is relative to a prior 
understanding of being”: this is his appropriation of transcendental idealism (Lafont 
2007:105). Second, his work is defined by the multiplication or “relativization of the Kantian 
conception of apriority”, that is his willingness to historicise the a priori, recognising 
different epochs, each with its own understandings of being (Lafont 2007:118). The result is 
a relativism driven by a basically Kantian framework, within which Heidegger simply 
“substitutes the ontological difference for the empirical/transcendental distinction” (Lafont 
2000: xii). 
 The question of how the a priori interacts with historical change is, of course, central 
to post-Kantian thought from Hegel onwards: as Foucault observed talk of a “historical a 
priori” produces “a rather startling effect” (Foucault 1971:127). Heidegger was extremely 
familiar with such issues from his work on Dilthey, whose ambition was nothing less than a 
“critique of historical reason”: indeed, Kisiel labels the 1924 draft of SZ the “Dilthey Draft” 
such is the extent of the influence (Dilthey 1988:141; Kisiel 1993:315). The idea of some 
kind of historical a priori, and the complexities that brings with it, is very clearly present in 
the key texts cited by Lafont. For example, when discussing the shift to modern mathematical 
physics, Heidegger describes the Galilean revolution in terms close to a Kuhnian ‘paradigm-
shift’: Galileo’s achievement was not in any sense straightforwardly empirical, rather he set 
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up a new model or “projected plan” in terms of which entities could be then interpreted, 
calculated and predicted (Ga41:89-91). This type of framework: 
[D]etermines in advance the constitution of the being of entities…This prior plan of 
the being of entities is inscribed within the basic concepts and principles of the 
science of nature. (Ga3:11) 
Underlying this move is an equation of such ‘paradigms’ with synthetic a priori judgments, 
themselves understood as transcendental principles in terms of which and through which we 
encounter entities (Ga41:183-4).v 
What is distinctive about Lafont’s Heidegger is the rigorous and systematic way in 
which she elaborates these initial moves. I want to highlight three dimensions of her approach 
in particular.  
First, each instance of the a priori retains the full determinative force of its Kantian 
predecessor. So, for example, both the Aristotelian and Galilean ontologies retain “the 
absolute authority…that a priori knowledge is supposed to have” (Lafont 2007:107). 
It is vital to see that for Lafont this is not simply an epistemic claim: it is not the claim that 
people find it hard or perhaps even impossible to escape from the assumptions that define our 
period or its best science. Rather, it is a constitutive claim, one which commits Heidegger to 
what is effectively a historicised transcendental idealism in which one set of appearances, 
those of the Greek world, is suddenly replaced by another, those of the modern one. 
[T]he way in which entities are understood must determine in advance which entities 
we are referring to or, in general terms, meaning must determine reference….Given 
that the prior understanding of the being of entities is what makes our experience an 
experience of some specific entities (rather than others), it determines what these 
entities are (for us), that is, it determines what they are accessible to us as….[T]he 
understanding of the being of entities determines all experience of those entities.  
(Lafont 2007:108. I have inverted the order of the final two sentences) 
The ontological difference is thus: 
A dichotomy in which one pole (the meaning pre-given in an understanding of being) 
necessarily assumes constitutive powers over the other (i.e. over our access to the 
referents, to the intraworldy entities). (Lafont 2000:180) 
Second, it follows that there exists an extreme incommensurability between the 
various frameworks. Since each understanding of being is “responsible for the constitution of 
objects…an alternative projection is (by definition) a projection of different objects and thus 
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incommensurable with it” (Lafont 2000: 171). This, Lafont argues, is the point which 
Heidegger is making in texts such as this: 
It is simply useless to measure the Aristotelian doctrine of motion against that of 
Galileo with respect to results, judging the former as backward and the latter as 
advanced. For in each case, nature means something completely different. (Ga45:52-
3; cited by Lafont in her 2007:111) 
In other words, each of the various a prioris constitute a genuinely distinct set of entities: 
claims about entities can only be true or false relative to that framework. 
Given that, according to Heidegger, entities are only accessible through a prior 
projection of their being, it is clear that entities made accessible by genuinely 
different projections are, by definition, not the same entities. (Lafont 2007:112) 
Kusch’s Heidegger, although motivated more by reflections on language and less by direct 
links to Kant, similarly sees us as “trapped in our project” (Kusch 1989:238). 
 Third, since the understanding of being determines the nature of the entities we can 
encounter, there is no possibility of that encounter forcing any revision in that understanding. 
For Lafont’s Heidegger, there is therefore a substantive class of claims, including the basics 
of both Aristotelian and Galilean physics, which are immune to empirical correction. In line 
with the incommensurability just discussed, these same principles cannot be criticised from 
any external perspective since the reference of any theory is determined entirely by the 
beliefs which constitute that theory: those who disagree are thus necessarily not talking about 
the same thing (Lafont 2007:112,117). This, unsurprisingly, has far reaching epistemic 
implications.  For example, Lafont sees Heidegger as unable to make sense of the standard 
idea of scientific progress, insofar as that entails the gradual revision of our principles based 
on their empirical testing: 
Thus, the attempt to conceive the historical changes in our understanding of being as a 
learning process is based on an illusion…They are unrevisable from within and 
inaccessible (meaningless) from without. (Lafont 2007:112) 
We now have a fairly detailed account of Lafont’s views in place: what should we 
make of them? There are, as ever in the history of philosophy, two questions: is this an 
intellectually viable position and was it Heidegger’s position? What is striking is that both 
Lafont and her opponents agree on a negative answer to the first question. For Lafont, the 
significance of Heidegger is ultimately as a cautionary tale, warning against the “indirect 
theory of reference” which supposedly lay behind his approach; he should, instead, have 
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opted for some kind of direct reference story, perhaps of a broadly Kripkean type (Lafont 
2000: xvii, 184). Other commentators, who typically agree with Lafont on little else, concur 
in this philosophically negative verdict. Wrathall, for example, describes the theory’s 
underlying assumptions regarding both reference and scientific progress “as patently absurd” 
(Wrathall 2011:121). I do not, however, want to approach the issue in terms either of 
reference or scientific progress: Heidegger’s views on both are changeable and hang on 
myriad subsidiary questions such as whether philosophy is a science.  
Instead, I want to make a more direct move. I think that the picture Lafont paints of 
Heidegger, whilst highly sophisticated, is also deeply mistaken. My aim in the second half of 
this chapter will be to advance an alternative reading, one which has at least as much textual 
support and which avoids the philosophical dangers of Lafont’s model. In line with the 
principle of charity, we should attribute this second view to Heidegger – as we will see, it is 
one on which he stands fundamentally opposed to relativism. 
 
(§3) Heidegger as Anti-Relativist: The Hermeneutic Reading 
I will now argue that Heidegger is not a relativist. Instead, his position is that relativism is an 
understandable, but ultimately misguided response to the errors of its dialectical opponents.   
As he put it himself: 
 The theories of relativism and scepticism originate in a partly justified opposition 
against a distorted absolutism and dogmatism with respect to the concept of truth. 
(Ga24:316) 
Heidegger’s own preferred tactic will be to put in to question the underlying assumptions 
which have left us oscillating between the two poles of relativism and absolutism. 
 Before I can address Heidegger’s position directly, however, I need to clear some 
other issues out of the way. The basic problem is that his views on relativism are interwoven 
with his stance on some of the most contested and complex topics in his thought: truth, 
idealism and being. Clearly, I cannot treat these all here; my aim instead is to get to a point 
where the key questions for current purposes can be isolated and focussed in on.  
Truth  
Heidegger clearly defends a view of truth that is in some important sense relational: as he 
puts it in a famous passage, in the absence of Dasein, Newton’s laws would not be true (SZ: 
226–7). They would not be false either: rather it is simply inappropriate to talk about truth or 
falsity under that condition (SZ: 226–7). As Kusch perceptively notes, this type of 
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relationality falls short of relativism; given his own relativistic reading of Heidegger, Kusch 
puts this down to a reluctance to state the doctrine openly: 
It seems that Heidegger should have gone further here by saying that Newton's laws 
are true only for those Daseins that share the same universal medium of meaning with 
Newton; yet the Heidegger of Being and Time does not seem to be ready to state the 
relativism of his notion of truth so bluntly. (Kusch 1989:191). 
As I see it, however, the key is that the dependence of truth on Dasein won’t entail relativism 
in any significant sense if all relevant properties of entities remain independent of Dasein. 
Suppose, for example, that the properties and behaviours identified by Newton’s laws would 
remain exactly as they are even if Dasein had never existed or if Dasein had always endorsed 
an Aristotelian view, and it is simply that one can only declare the laws “true” insofar as 
someone believes them. What we would then have is a proposal to modify the use of the truth 
predicate rather than any substantive relativism. Indeed, this is precisely what I have argued 
elsewhere: Heidegger’s remarks on truth are primarily motivated by the phenomenological 
assumption that “being true is a comportmental relation between the presumed and intuited, 
namely identity” (Ga20:70).vi We do not need to settle this here; what matters is simply that 
there is a non-relativistic way of reading Heidegger’s remarks on Newton.  
Idealism and Being 
The relativist might concede that this is correct, but argue that the problem is with the realist 
assumptions in the antecedent of my conditional: after all, for someone like Lafont, the 
properties of entities do indeed change along with Dasein’s views. In this way, the focus 
shifts from truth to idealism. My own view is that Heidegger was a realist, and I think the 
exegetical situation is much more complex than Lafont recognises, partly because Heidegger, 
perhaps uniquely, also viewed Kant as a realist (Golob 2013). But again, this is not the place 
to debate those issues: one fundamental issue, as Blattner has stressed, is that the ambiguity 
between realism and idealism is present in the very definition of “being” used by Heidegger.  
On the one hand, as “being” is traditionally used to mean something like “that in virtue of 
which an entity is an entity and an entity of the sort it is” (Blattner 1999): thus, Heidegger 
himself introduces “being” as “that which determines entities as entities” (SZ:6). On the 
other, Heidegger immediately moves to a definition of “being” as “that in terms of which 
entities are already understood” (SZ: 6). Carman thus identifies “being” as “the condition of 
the intelligibility of entities as entities”, whilst Frede similarly glosses “to be” as “to be 
understood as” (Carman 2003:15; Frede 1993:57). The result is that to draw the balance 
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between the realist and idealist strands of Heidegger’s project one would need first to get 
clear on his conception of being, and indeed on his understanding of Kant. But again, all we 
need for current purposes, is to note that a realist reading is by no means impossible: there 
are, for example, plenty of passages which accord with a straightforward realism on which all 
the plausibly mind-independent properties of entities are indeed mind-independent. Consider 
these: 
World is only, if, and as long as Dasein exists. Nature can also be when 
no Dasein exists. (Ga24: 241) 
 
Entities are in themselves the kind of entities they are, and in the way 
they are, even if, for example, Dasein does not exist. (Ga26: 194) 
 
As with truth, I cannot settle this debate here: my point is simply to show that they are indeed 
debates, and thus that there is space for something other than a relativistic reading. The task 
now is to return back to relativism itself and to sketch out how such a reading might look. 
Back to Relativism 
The place to start is with a basic point made by Wrathall against Lafont: 
[I]f Heidegger were simply advancing the weaker hypothesis that whenever we 
experience anything, ‘we have always already understood entities in one way or 
other’, his claim would be unobjectionable. But [Lafont] sees him as advancing the 
much stronger thesis that ‘the way in which we in fact have always already 
understood everything is constitutive of what things are or of what things we 
can refer to’ (Lafont 2000: 139, n31)…No one would deny that Heidegger believes 
our experience of things is guided by a meaningfully structured understanding of the 
world. (Wrathall 2002:219-20; original emphasis). 
Heidegger certainly thinks that an understanding of being must proceed any encounter with 
entities: indeed, this is how he defines the Copernican Turn (Ga3:13). But, as Wrathall 
observes, that need not imply that this understanding constitutes entities in the very strong 
sense which Lafont relies upon. Instead, it might simply shape our encounter in some much 
weaker sense. 
 How should we develop this basic point? Heidegger himself provides a detailed 
answer: given the importance of the following passage, I quote in full.  
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It was an error of phenomenology to believe that phenomena could be correctly seen 
merely through unprejudiced looking. But it is just as great an error to believe that, 
since perspectives are always necessary, the phenomena themselves can never be seen 
and that everything amounts to contingent, subjective anthropological standpoints. 
From these two impossibilities, we obtain the necessary insight that our central task 
and methodological problem is to arrive at the right perspective. We need to take a 
preliminary view of the phenomenon but precisely for this reason it is of decisive 
importance whether the guiding perspective is adequate to the phenomenon, i.e. 
whether it is derived from its substantial content or not (or only constructed). It is not 
because we must view it from some perspective or other that the phenomenon gets 
blocked off to us, but because the perspective adopted most often does not have a 
genuine origin in the phenomenon itself. (Ga34:286; original emphasis) 
Heidegger here rejects the fantasy of a view from nowhere. We always approach entities in 
terms of some understanding of being; we always operate out of some specific hermeneutic 
situation. But those assumptions do not blankly determine the entity as on Lafont’s picture. 
Rather, “our central task” is to engage in a continuous process of adjusting and recalibrating 
our standpoint in order “to arrive at the right perspective”.vii The “mode of discovery” must 
be “as it were, regulated and prescribed by the entity to be discovered and by its mode of 
being” (Ga24:99). Thus, the key task is to “secure the right access” to the entities we are 
interrogating (SZ:15), the right starting point for the inquiry, the right methods (SZ:36). All 
the while we need to be conscious that many familiar principles or concepts or tools will be 
unsuitable because they are not sufficiently attentive to the dynamics of the domains in 
question (SZ:36); for example, one cannot simply appeal to modal logic without recognising 
that the notions of modality appropriate to different entities are not even coextensive 
(SZ:143–4). In order to establish a “stable way of coining the appropriate concepts” (SZ:55) 
we therefore need, in classic hermeneutic fashion, to first become aware of the baggage, the 
imbalances and prejudices, which the tradition has bequeathed us (SZ:22). To do this, SZ 
seeks to identify certain systematic sources of error, such as Das Man, and certain systematic 
devices for escaping such error, such as anxiety. The result is not a relativistic picture, but 
one that is both deeply phenomenological and deeply hermeneutic: the key “methodological 
problem” is precisely how to develop our understanding of being so that it allows the 
phenomenon to “show itself from itself”. 
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 One reason this result has been missed, I would suggest, is a tendency by 
commentators to conflate regional and fundamental ontology: the contrast is not mentioned, 
for example, in the Lafont article which sets out her view in most detail (Lafont 2007). As I 
see it, Heideggerian fundamental ontology, for example the claim that Dasein encounters 
entities by locating them within a teleologically structured world, has a classically a priori, 
universal and transcendental status: it holds for all Dasein. By extension, there is no question 
of adjusting it to the entity in question: it is unchangeable. But this is unproblematic. Not 
only is it universal, thus preventing the proliferation of frameworks which so troubled Lafont, 
but it concerns only properties that are obviously relational: not even the most ardent realist 
would have a problem with the fact that something’s being “equipment” depends on the 
existence of Dasein. But when it comes to regional ontologies such as Aristotelian or 
Galilean science, ontological truth is, to borrow a phrase from Haugeland, “beholden to 
entities” (Haugeland 2013:201): it is and must be open to adjustment and revision as we seek 
to “arrive at the right perspective” (Ga34:286; original emphasis). 
 To develop this approach further, I want to address two issue in particular. The first 
concerns empirical correction in the natural sciences. As you will recall on Lafont’s account 
Heidegger is committed to a near complete rejection of empirical inquiry: all such a process 
amounts to is the ‘playing out’ of the “axioms” which pre-define that understanding of being 
(Lafont 2000:286). On my reading, in contrast, things are much more fluid. Heidegger 
certainly doubts that first order scientific study will be enough to shift dominant but mistaken 
paradigms. But this is not because our understandings of being are inherently “unrevisable 
from within and inaccessible (meaningless) from without” (Lafont 2007, 112). It is rather 
because a mixture of methods is needed to adjust our perspectives in the right ways. For 
example, Heidegger criticises the natural sciences, in particular modern mathematical 
physics, by arguing that their key concepts are drawn from historically questionable sources 
(SZ:362;  Ga41:33,92-3). For Heidegger, these methodological failings imply that such 
sciences are in an important sense not genuinely attending to the phenomena themselves: for 
all their stress on experimentation, they are not truly engaging with the data, but rather are 
driven by antecedent assumptions to “skip over the facts” (Ga41:93).viii This is how we 
should read passages such as the following: 
The Greek doctrine of natural processes does not rest upon insufficient observation, 
but rather upon a different (and perhaps even deeper) concept of nature that is prior to 
all particular observations. (Ga45:52) 
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This passage was cited by Lafont in favour of her approach (Lafont 2000:271-2), but one can 
now see it that it is perfectly compatible with the hermeneutic alternative which I have 
defended: the point is not that we are just dealing with two different worlds, but that Greek 
investigative methods had at least some substantial advantages. One may, of course deny this 
– in line with Heidegger’s own practice it gives a significance to philosophy and its history 
which few natural scientists would accept – but it is not a relativist view. Similarly consider 
this, again cited by Lafont: 
[T]he advanced modern science of nature is not a whit more true than the Greek; on 
the contrary, at most it is more untrue since it is completely caught up in the web of 
its own methodology, and for all its discoveries, it lets that which is actually the 
object of these discoveries slip away: namely, the nature of the relation of human 
beings to it and their place within it. (Ga45:53; cited by Lafont 2000:272) 
The point here is precisely to criticise modern natural science for “letting the object…slip 
away”, and the explanation is exactly what my reading predicts: methodological 
shortcomings which prevent it from being sufficiently attentive to that object. 
 The second issue I want to highlight concerns Heidegger’s lifelong commitment to 
what one might call ‘rampant property pluralism’. By this I mean that he is extremely hostile 
to programmes which reduce certain properties in order to avoid including them in a final 
ontology. For example, he opposes the standard projectivist stories on which properties such 
as ‘toolhood’ are reduced to “merely a way of taking” those entities: 
The kind of Being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand. But this 
characteristic is not to be understood as merely a way of taking them, as if we were 
talking such 'aspects' into the 'entities' which we proximally encounter, or as if some 
world-stuff which is proximally present-at-hand in itself were 'given subjective 
colouring' in this way…Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in 
themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially. (SZ:71; original emphasis) 
Similarly, he holds both that individual Dasein have causal properties, for example being a 
certain mass, and other properties, such as freedom, which must be explained in terms of an 
entirely different framework (SZ:135; Ga31: 210). Whilst not as important as the preceding 
issue regarding empiricism and methodology, it is important to bear this in mind when 
reading Heidegger on the clash between Aristotelian and modern science: there is a sense for 
him in which both are true, not because of relativism, but because both capture different 
aspects of the very wide range of properties that entities do in fact possess. 
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Bringing these remarks together, one can now see how Lafont’s view actually 
conflicts with the basic spirit of texts such as SZ, one of whose central concerns 
is precisely to highlight and critique cases in which a thinker refuses to revise some initial 
method, concept, approach or assumption in the face of the phenomena. For example, 
Descartes is extensively criticised for imposing a pre-given framework on entities (SZ: 96). 
Indeed, this is Cartesianism’s original sin: 
The kind of being which belongs to entities within the world is something which they 
themselves might have been permitted to present; but Descartes does not let them do 
so. (SZ: 96) 
If Lafont’s approach were right, this would not be a criticism but an unavoidable statement of 
fact. 
  
(§4) Conclusion – Relativism as Symptom Not Solution 
 
On the interpretation I have defended Heidegger was never a relativist. Instead, his position 
fuses phenomenology, hermeneutics and Kantianism in a distinctive way, one that gives 
priority to the process of adjusting our ontology to map the entities and objects we encounter. 
This process has an inherently circular structure: as we recognise ways in which our 
understanding is not calibrated to the phenomena, we continually revise that understanding, 
thus throwing up new ‘feedback’ which in turn forces further revisions (SZ: 153). In line with 
the caveat offered in the introduction, my focus here has been on early Heidegger, but it is 
very natural to see the shifts in his later work as motivated by a growing fear that the 
framework of SZ itself failed this test, preventing him from accommodating, from doing 
justice to phenomena and events from artworks to physis itself. 
 I want to end with one final piece of evidence, and one that might seem to have a 
particular clarity and directness. As Kusch notes, there is a letter to Löwith in which 
Heidegger openly identifies as a “dogmatic subjective relativist” (Kusch 1989:191). How can 
my reading handle this?   
This is the same document in which Heidegger famously identifies as a “Christian 
theologian” (original emphasis) rather than a philosopher, and it is a complex text. The 
immediate context is the question of facticity and philosophical method: Heidegger is arguing 
against a university which he sees as plagued by “fossilized ‘intellecutualism’” (Heidegger 
2007:101). Philosophically, he defends a position on which “with respect to the things in 
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themselves we are ‘absolutely’ objectively rigorous”, but where this rigour arises not from 
some “fictious non-personality”, a view from nowhere, but from an intense personal 
engagement (Heidegger 2007:101 – original emphasis). We should be wary about trying to 
reconstruct too precise a view on the basis of an informal letter, but one can see that the 
contours of Heidegger’s position here match those defended above: there is no tension at all 
between a historical, concrete starting point and an ambition to accuracy with respect to the 
things themselves. On the contrary, as in §3, the two go hand in hand. It is also clear that the 
relativist label is not one Heidegger himself is happy with: he introduces it only on the 
penultimate page and only to frame the contrast with Löwith, who is identified as an 
“objective relativist”. Heidegger immediately states the resultant taxonomy is of “no interest 
to me at all” (Heidegger 2007:101).   
In short what we see here, exactly as in his published work, is a willingness to 
recognize some merit in relativism as a crude way of articulating a deeper truth, combined 
with an insistence on distancing his own philosophy from the term. Ultimately, for 
Heidegger, relativism is not so much a solution as a symptom, a symptom of the mix of 
epistemological confusions, tensions and insights which he takes the tradition to have 
bequeathed, and which his own hermeneutic model of truth attempts to move beyond. 
 
Abbreviations 
References are to the Gesamtausgabe edition (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975–; abbreviated as 
Ga), with the exception of SZ, where I use the standard text (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 
1957).  With respect to translations, I have endeavoured to stay close to the Macquarrie and 
Robinson version of SZ on the grounds that it is by far the best known. Where other 
translations exist, I have typically consulted these but often modified them: the relevant 
translations are listed below.  
SZ  Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1957); Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and 
E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) 
Ga3  Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1998) 
Ga24  Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1997); Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
trans. A. Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982) 
Ga31  Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie (1982); The 
Essence of Human Freedom, trans. T. Sadler (London: Continuum, 2002) 
Ga41  Die Frage nach dem Ding (1984) 
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Ga45  Grundfragen der Philosophie (1984) 
Ga61  Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (1985) 
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i	For	a	penetrating	analysis	of	the	dissertation	and	its	links	to	the	broader	debates	around	judgement	in	the	
period,	see	Martin	2006.	
ii For the key existing responses to Lafont, see Carman 2002 and Wrathall 2002. 
iii The locus classicus for the standard reading is Dreyfus 1991; Dreyfus 2005 gives a particularly clear 
exposition of the consequences for language. My own view is that Heidegger defends a unique and highly 
innovative position which is conceptualist and yet not tacitly propositionalist. To put it another way, his aim is 
to cash conceptuality without appeal to language (for details, see Golob 2014). 
iv There are complicated exegetical questions as to what divergence Kant allows for non-rational animals or 
creatures such as angels but for current purposes we can simply bracket that and work with a simpler, 
universalist Kant. 
v This reflects Heidegger’s basic understanding of the synthetic a priori as equivalent to ontological knowledge. 
He summarises the Copernican turn by stating that: 
What Kant wants to say is this: ‘Not all cognition is ontic and where there is such cognition it is made 
possible only through ontological cognition.’ (Ga3: 13)	
vi The debate here is closely connected to Tugendhat’s influential claim that Heidegger robs truth of any 
normative force (the key text is Tugendhat 1994). Unsurprisingly, Lafont is highly sympathetic to such a 
reading (Lafont 2000:148). For detailed arguments against both Tugendhat and Lafont see Golob 2014:180-191. 
vii I draw here on arguments developed in greater detail in Golob 2014. 
viii By extension, Heidegger is positive towards scientists, such as Bohr and Heisenberg, who he thinks combine 
empirical research with this kind of broader methodological and conceptual reflection (Ga41:67). 
																																																						
